Biometric privacy protection : guidelines and technologies by R. Donida Labati et al.
Biometric Privacy Protection:
Guidelines and Technologies
Ruggero Donida Labati, Vincenzo Piuri, and Fabio Scotti
Universita` degli Studi di Milano, Department of Information Technology,
via Bramante 65, I-26013 Crema (CR), Italy
{ruggero.donida,vincenzo.piuri,fabio.scotti}@unimi.it
http://www.dti.unimi.it
Abstract. Compared with traditional techniques used to establish the
identity of a person, biometric systems offer a greater confidence level
that the authenticated individual is not impersonated by someone else.
However, it is necessary to consider different privacy and security aspects
in order to prevent possible thefts and misuses of biometric data. The
effective protection of the privacy must encompass different aspects, such
as the perceived and real risks pertaining to the users, the specificity of
the application, the adoption of correct policies, and data protection
methods as well. This chapter focuses on the most important privacy
issues related to the use of biometrics, it presents actual guidelines for the
implementation of privacy-protective biometric systems, and proposes a
discussion of the methods for the protection of biometric data.
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1 Introduction
Traditional techniques used to establish the identity of a person are based on
surrogate representations of his/her identity, such as passwords, keys, tokens,
and identity cards. In many situations, these representations cannot guarantee
a sufficient level of security because they can be shared, misplaced or stolen.
Biometric recognition systems, instead, are based on physiological or behavioral
characteristics of the individual, which are univocally related to their owner,
cannot be shared or misplaced, and are more difficult to be stolen. The use of
biometric systems is continuously increasing in different applicative scenarios
[46] and the related market is showing a significant positive trend. In 2011, it
reached the amount of 5 billion dollars and it is expected to reach 12 billion dol-
lars by the end of 2015 [1]. Typical applicative scenarios are: physical access con-
trol (critical areas, public buildings, sport arenas, bank caveau, transportations,
etc.); surveillance (private buildings, public areas, etc.); government applications
(identity cards, passports, driving licenses, immigration control, health cards,
access control to online government services, etc.); forensic applications (body
identification, crime investigation, searching of disappeared childrens, kinships,
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intelligence, etc.); logical access control to data, networks and services (home
banking, ATM, supermarkets, e-commerce, mobile phones, computers, etc.).
In order to prevent possible thefts and misuses of biometric data, it is neces-
sary to consider different privacy and security aspects. Security and privacy are
two different concepts because the privacy protection is more restrictive than the
security protection. The security ensures: authentication, data integrity, confi-
dentiality, and non-repudiation. Differently, the privacy requires also the data
protection.
The protection from privacy abuses is very important in biometric systems.
For example, if the biometric data related to an individual are stolen, this person
can be impersonated for a long period of time and it is not easy to modify or
substitute the compromised data. This is due to the fact that biometric traits
are unique for each individual and strictly associated to their owner. Moreover,
biometric traits are irrevocable, in the sense that the association cannot be
changed during the human life.
The public acceptance of a biometric system is strictly related to the privacy
risks perceived by the users. Usually, these risks are different from the real risks
associated to a biometric system. In general, the most important perceived risk
is related to possible identity thefts. Other perceived risks are related to misuses
of the personal data, for example for tracing all the activities of the individuals
or for operating proscription lists. Real risks should be evaluated considering
different factors associated to the applicative context and used biometric traits.
Examples of these aspects are the modalities adopted for storing the personal
data, the owner of the system, the used recognition modality (authentication or
identification in a biometric database), the durability of the used traits, and the
class of the trait (physiological or compartmental).
It is possible to consider a privacy-protective biometric system as a system
that drastically reduce the real risks associated to the use of biometric data. In
order to properly design a privacy-protective biometric system, it is not suffi-
cient to evaluate only aspects related to performances, costs, acceptability, and
applicative conditions, but it is necessary to follow a set of guidelines for the
use of biometric data [32]. These guidelines permit to effectively reduce the risks
related to possible misuses of personal data.
In order to protect the privacy of the users, it is also necessary to consider the
possible attacks that can be performed to a biometric system. In general, biomet-
ric systems are composed by four modules: sensor, feature extractor, database,
and matcher. Each module can be subject to adversary attacks. As shown in
Fig. 1, it is possible to distinguish eight distinct classes of attacks to the differ-
ent modules [19, 44, 47]: (I) fake biometric at the sensor, (II) resubmission of
old digitally stored biometrics signal, (III) override feature extractor, (IV) tam-
pering with the feature representation; (V) override matcher, (VI) tampering
with stored templates, (VII) channel attack between stored templates and the
matcher, (VIII) decision override.
There are different classes of techniques that should be used to protect the
privacy of the users also from possible attacks. Every component of the biomet-
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Fig. 1. Points of attack in a biometric system.
ric system should in fact be protected by using properly methods. Important
classes of techniques are: liveness detection methods, physical and cryptographic
methods for the channel protection, secure code execution practices, template
protection methods [25].
In this chapter, the most treated class of techniques for the protection of bio-
metric systems regards the template protection methods. In a biometric appli-
cation, the template is an abstract representation of the physiological or behav-
ioral features, extracted from the acquired biometric samples (signals, images, or
frame sequences). Template protection methods permit to perform the recogni-
tion by using a protected representation of the biometric templates. In the litera-
ture, there are different methods for the biometric template protection: methods
based on the transformation of the template (cancelable biometrics), methods
based on cryptographic algorithms that perform the recognition by comparing
cryptographic keys (biometric cryptosystems), methods based on cryptographic
techniques that permits to perform a set of operations without converting the
data in the plain domain (cryptographically secure methods).
The chapter discusses the privacy issues related to the use of biometrics and
presents some of the most advanced techniques available today for the privacy
protection of biometric data. Section 2 presents the problems related to the pri-
vacy risks, describes a possible classification of the privacy protection levels, and
overviews the guidelines for the design of privacy-protective biometric systems.
Section 3 proposes a brief review of the template protection techniques in the
literature, while the last section is devoted to conclusions.
2 Privacy in Biometric Systems
Traditional authentication methods are based on somewhat known (e.g. a pass-
word) or a possessed object (e.g. a key or a token). If passwords or keys are
theft of stolen, it is easy to revoke or replace them. Differently, biometric traits
are univocally related to their owners and cannot be replaced or modified. If
data related to a biometric trait are stolen, the owner of the trait can be im-
personated in many different biometric systems and for a long period of time
or the individual can be included in different biometric systems without explicit
consents. For this reason, it is particularly important to protect biometric data.
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It is possible to distinguish three different perspectives about the privacy in
biometrics. The first perspective is related to the risks perceived by the users and
should be considered in order to evaluate the acceptability of the system itself.
The second perspective regards the application context in which the biometric
system should be exploited and permits to properly design privacy protection
techniques. The last aspect that should be considered is the used biometric trait.
Each biometric trait, in fact, presents different propriets.
The evaluation of the risks perceived by users is a complex task because the
risk perception is different for every person. Generally speaking, one of the most
important perceived risks is related to the fact that the persons consider the
acquisition of the biometric traits as an exact permanent filing of their activities
and behaviors, and the idea that the biometric systems can guarantee a recogni-
tion accuracy equal to 100% is very common. Other perceived risks consist in the
use of the collected biometric data for malicious purposes, and for tracing all the
activities of the individuals or for operating proscription lists. Another impor-
tant perceived risk is the fact that the acquisition of some biometric traits can
be dangerous for the health. For example, the iris images are usually captured
by using infrared illuminators, which can be erroneously considered as harmful).
This psychological aspects should been taken into account, and, during the de-
ployment of the biometric system, it is very important to inform the users about
the real risks for the health and for the privacy, as well as all the procedures
designed and applied to protect the biometric data.
The evaluation of the application context permits to determine some real risks
of privacy invasiveness. Table 1 plots a qualitative representation of the privacy
risks versus ten different application features, according to the International
Biometric Group [32]:
1. Covert recognition systems (for example surveillance applications) are more
privacy invasive than overt biometric systems. In some cases, covert appli-
cations can use biometric data without any knowledge or explicit consent of
the individuals.
2. Applications that require a mandatory use of biometric systems are more
invasive for the user’s privacy than applications in which the use of biometric
technologies is optional. In this case, the users can decide to not be checked
by a biometric system, and they can adopt a different authentication method.
3. Identification systems perform the biometric recognition by comparing the
acquired biometric data with N identities stored in a database. Authenti-
cation systems consider only the acquired biometric data and the declared
identity, performing a 1 to 1 comparison. In most of the cases, the biometric
database used for performing the identification is situated in a physical place
different from the one in which the biometric sensors is located. For these
reasons, identifications present more privacy risks than authentications.
4. It is possible to distinguish systems that use biometric data for a fixed period
and systems that can use these information for indefinite time. Policies that
define the storing duration of biometric data can reduce privacy risks.
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Table 1. Applicative aspects concerning the privacy according to the IBG (Iternational
Biometric Group).
Lower Risk Question Greater Risk
Overt Is the system deployed overtly or covertly? Covert
Optional Is the system optional or mandatory? Mandatory
Verification Is the system used for Identification or Verification? Identification
Fixed Period Is the system deployed for a fixed period of time? Indefinite
Private Sector Is the system deployed in the private or public sector? Public Sector
Individual/Customer In what role is the user interacting with the system? Employee/Citizen
Enrollee Who owns the biometric information? Institution
Personal storage Where is the biometric data stored? Database Storage
Behavioral What type of biometric technology is being deployed? Physiological
Templates Does the system use templates, samples or both? Sample/Images
5. Usually, biometric applications in the public sector are considered to be more
susceptible to privacy invasiveness than applications in the private sector.
An important fear of the users is related to possible government abuses.
6. The role of the individuals that use the biometric system has great impact on
the privacy. The privacy risks are associated to the rights of the individuals
over the stored biometric data, and are lower in the case when the users
retain usage rights. For example, there are more privacy risks for employees
and citizens than individuals and costumers.
7. The applications in which private or public institutions own the used bio-
metric data are more privacy invasive than the applications in which the
users (enrollee) own their data. The user control of the data is not possible
in all the biometric applications.
8. Biometric systems that use databases of biometric data (database storage)
present more privacy risks with respect to systems based on data stored
in smartcard or memory devices possessed by the users (personal storage)
because the use of personal memory devices can prevent possible abuses.
9. The use of physiological biometric traits presents more privacy risks than the
use of behavioral traits. In most of the cases, physiological traits can obtain
more recognition accuracy, are more harder to mask or alter, and can be
acquired with less user cooperation.
10. Biometric systems that store samples and images are more subject to privacy
risks than systems that store biometric templates. This is due to the fact that
templates reveal more limited information.
In order to determine the real risks of privacy invasiveness, it is also necessary
to consider the adopted biometric traits because they can introduce different
kinds of risks. Four important features related to the tecnologies associated to
the different biometric traits are presented in [32]:
1. The first feature is the possibility to use the biometric trait in identifica-
tion systems. Not all the biometric traits can be used for the identification
because this process requires high performances in terms of accuracy and
speed. Examples of biometric traits that can be used for performing the
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identification are the iris and fingerprint. In general, systems based on traits
that can be used in identification are more invasive for the user’s privacy.
2. The second feature is associated to the possibility of the trait to be used in
covert systems. For example, the face trait can be more easily used in covert
recognition systems with respect to the fingerprint trait. Covert systems
present more privacy risks than overt systems.
3. The third feature evaluates how much biometric traits can be considered as
physiological or behavioral. Not all the biometric traits can be considered
as completely physiological or behavioral. The face trait, for example, can
be considered as physiological but can be modified by the user’s behaviors
(expressions, make up, etc.). Behavioral traits can be considered as more
privacy compliant because they can be modified by the users and are less
permanent then physiological traits.
4. The forth feature is the database compatibility and is related to two points:
the technology interoperability between systems based on different databases,
and the presence of numerous and/or large biometric databases. An example
of trait with high database interoperability is the fingerprint since there are
many large databases containing standardized templates related to this trait.
Traits characterized by a lower technology interoperability can be considered
as more privacy compliant.
Performing a weighted mean of these features, it is possible to classify the
overall risk level related to the technologies based on a specific biometric trait.
Examples of traits that present a high risk level are the face and fingerprint. A
medium risk can be assigned to the iris and retina, and traits characterized by
low risks for the privacy are the hand, voice, keystroke, and signature.
Considering the different characteristics of the traits and application con-
texts, the development and deployment of biometric systems requires the anal-
ysis of at least nine different aspects: cost, usability, speed, social acceptance,
accuracy, scalability, interoperability, security, and privacy. Different biometric
technologies can provide good performances in one or more of these aspects. The
choice of the adopted technology should be done by considering the most import
characteristics for the evaluated application. As shown in Fig. 2, the nine main
evaluative aspects can be quantized and plotted in a nine-dimensional space
(e.g., in a spider diagram), where a specific application is represented by a point
in this space.
Considering the privacy aspect, it is possible to define four different classes:
protective, sympathetic, neutral, invasive [32]:
1. Privacy-protective applications use biometrics in order to protect personal
information that might otherwise be compromised. In this case, the use of
biometric recognition techniques provide a mean for an individual to estab-
lish a trusted identity, and permits to limit the accesses to sensible data.
Examples of privacy-protective applications are systems for the enterprise
security and accountholder verification:
2. Privacy-sympathetic applications are designed to protect the biometric data
from unauthorized access and usage. All the elements of these applications
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Fig. 2. Evaluative aspects of biometric systems.
are designed considering privacy protection techniques. Most of the current
applications can incorporate privacy-sympathetic elements.
3. Privacy-neutral applications use biometrics without considering privacy as-
pects. In these applications, the privacy impact is usually slight. Examples of
privacy-neutral applications are some access control technologies and authen-
tication systems for electronic devices (personal computers, mobile phones,
etc.).
4. A Privacy-invasive applications permit the use of personal data in a fashion
that is contrary to privacy principles. Applications that use biometrics with-
out any knowledge or explicit consent of the individuals and systems that
use biometric data for undisclosed purposes or beyond the initial scope ap-
pertain to this class. Surveillance applications and some national ID services
can be considered as privacy-invasive.
In order to design privacy-sympathetic and privacy-protective systems, it is
necessary to follow a set of guidelines [32]. These guidelines are related to: scope
and capabilities of the system; user control of personal data; disclosure, auditing
and accountability of the biometric system; data protection techniques:
1. The scope and capabilities of the system should be declared to the users
and should not be extended during the life of the system. Biometric data
should also be deleted from the database after a period of time known by
the users. The storage of biometric data is particularly critical. In order to
protect the privacy of the individuals, in fact, it is necessary to store only
the minimum quantity of information necessary to perform the biometric
recognition. For this reason, no other data should be saved and the system
should store only biometric templates deleting raw data (images, signals,
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and frame sequences) as soon as possible. Moreover, no other personal data
should be integrated into the biometric template biometric templates should
not be used as unique identifiers.
2. The user should have the control of the biometric data. The use of the
biometric system should be voluntary. The user should also have the possi-
bilities to be unrolled and to change or modify her data. Users should also
be enrolled with some degrees of anonymity.
3. A disclosure regarding the biometric system should be provided. This doc-
ument should regard the system purpose, enrollment modalities, matching
modalities, optional or mandatory use of the biometric recognition, individu-
als who are responsible for the system, the data protection system. In fact, it
is important to let users know when the biometric system is used, especially
when enrolment and verification or identification phases are carried on. Each
operator should also be made accountable in order to detect possible errors
or misuses. Moreover, the owner of the biometric system and the operators
should be to provide a clear and effective process of auditing when an in-
stitution or a third party entity need to perform a critical review of all the
modules which compose the biometric system.
4. The system should also provide mechanisms for the protection of all the
steps performed by the biometric system from possible attacks. Aspects that
should be considered are: use of encryption primitives, adoption of private
networks, design and management of algorithms and infrastructures based
on the state of the art best practices, placement of the biometric system in a
secure and controlled area. These aspects should be maintained throughout
the life cycle of the of the system and the results of every performed recog-
nition recognitions should also be protected. Another important practice is
to limit the access to the biometric data to a defined number of operators.
Template protection techniques should also be adopted in order to improve
the user acceptance of the system and to overcame legal issues related to
the respect of privacy protection laws that are currently ruling in several
countries.
3 Technologies for Biometric Privacy
In the literature, there are many different methods for the protection of biometric
templates. An ideal biometric template protection method should satisfy four
properties [24, 25]:
1. diversity: the secure template must not allow cross-matching across databases;
2. revocability: compromised template can be revoked;
3. security: the estimation of the plain template from the secure template must
be computationally hard;
4. performance: the accuracy of the biometric system must not be degraded by
the biometric template protection method.
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Fig. 3. Cancelable biometrics: enrollment and verification.
These four proprieties cannot be guaranteed by encrypting the templates with
standard methods (e.g. RSA, AES, etc.). In fact, using these methods, the in-
traclass variability (biometric data captured from the same biometric trait look
different from one another) does not allow to perform the matching in the en-
crypted domain. Therefore, it is necessary to decrypt the templates during every
recognition attempt. This approach is not secure and it is necessary to adopt
methods designed for the protection of biometric data.
In the literature, most of the biometric template protection methods are
based on two different classes of techniques: cancelable biometrics, and biometric
cryptosystems [25, 45]. Recent researches also proposed other approaches based
on cryptographically secure methods [11].
3.1 Cancelable biometrics
Cancelable biometrics are based on intentional, repeatable distortions of biomet-
ric data. The used transformations permit to perform comparisons of biometric
templates in the transformed domain [42]. During the enrollment phase, the
biometric data T is modified by applying a transformation function F with pa-
rameters K obtained by a random key or a password. The transformed template
F (T,K) is then stored in the database. The authentication step applies the
same transformation to the query data Q and directly matches the transformed
templates F (Q,K) and F (T,K). Fig. 3 schematizes the described process.
The main advantage of this technique is that, if a transformed template
is compromised, cancelable biometrics permit to easily substitute the stored
transformed template by changing the transformation parameters. The design
of the transformation functions is particularly critical because it is necessary to
adopt functions that are robust to intra-class variations in order to do not reduce
the accuracy of the biometric system. Another aspect that should be considered
is that the correlation of transformed templates should not reveal information
about the transformation function. Transformation functions can be applied to
biometric samples (e.g. face images [2]), processed signals (e.g. the iris pattern
[12]) or templates (e.g. features extracted from a face image [53]). It is possible
to distinguish two different classes of methods: biometric salting, non-invertible
transforms.
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Usually, systems based on the biometric salting transform features using an
invertible function defined by a user-specific key or password. Considering that
the used transformation is invertible, the password must be securely stored by
the user and presented during each authentication. The principal advantage of
the biometric salting is that it is possible to use multiple templates for the same
biometric trait because the keys are specified by the users. An important lim-
itation of methods based on keys or passwords is that they are not usable in
identification systems. Moreover, if the key is known, it is possible to obtain the
original template. In the literature, one of the most used methods based on the
biometric salting is the BioHashing [2, 54, 39]. This method is designed for the
fingerprint trait and is divisible in two steps [27]: an invariant and discrimina-
tive transform of the biometric data, with a moderate degree offset tolerance;
a discretization of the data. There are also methods designed for face recogni-
tion systems. One of these methods uses the Fisher discriminant analysis and
then performs a transformation of the obtained vectors by using a randomly
selected set of orthogonal directions [53]. Differently, the method proposed in
[49] is based on minimum average correlation energy filters. Salting methods
can also be applied to different biometric traits (e.g. iris [12], palmprint, and
dynamic handwriting [36]).
In the literature, many methods secure the templates by using non-invertible
transformation functions. Non-invertible transformation refers to a one-way func-
tion that is computable in polynomial time and hard to invert. The main ad-
vantage of this class of methods is that the protection of the plain biometric
template is more secure than the one offered by the methods appertaining to
the salting class. In fact, if the key and/or the transformed template are known,
the estimation of the plain template is a computationally hard task (consider-
ing a brute force attack). Another advantage of these methods is that diversity
and revocability can be achieved by using different transformation functions. The
main problem is that it is difficult to design transformation functions that satisfy
both the discriminability and the non-invertibility. For example, a study on the
measurement of the real non-invertibility of methods based on the fingerprint is
presented in [37]. Another important aspect is that the transformation function
depends on the biometric features to be used in a specific application. Moreover,
similarly to the biometric salting, the adoption of keys obtained by passwords or
tokens does not permit to use methods based on non-invertible transformation
functions in identification systems. In the literature, there are methods based on
non-invertible transformation functions designed for different biometric traits.
For example, fingerprint [28], face [56, 55], and signature [35]. A general schema
is proposed in [42] and is based on a non-invertible function designed to trans-
form a point pattern by using high order polynomials. This method can be used
in fingerprint based on minutiae features, and voice recognition systems. Also
the approach proposed in [43] is designed for fingerprint recognition systems and
proposes three different functions (Cartesian, Polar, and functional) in order to
transform minutiae templates. A different schema called Biotope is proposed
in [6, 7]. This schema transforms the original biometric data by using crypto-
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Fig. 4. Key-binding biometric cryptosystem: enrollment and verification.
graphic primitives and supports a robust distance metric in order to perform
the matching. The approach supports both transforms that are public-key cryp-
tographically invertible and/or using cryptographic one-way functions (such as
MD5). The Biotope schema can be applied to different biometric traits, such as
face [6] and fingerprint [7].
3.2 Biometric cryptosystems
Biometric cryptosystems was originally designed in order to secure cryptographic
keys by using biometric information or to directly compute cryptographic keys
from biometric data [25]. Nowadays, these techniques are also used for the pri-
vacy protection of biometric templates. Biometric cryptosystems store public
data regarding the biometric trait, called helper data. During the authentica-
tion process, the helper data is used in order to extract a cryptographic key
from the biometric query sample. The matching step checks the validity of the
obtained key in order to verify the identity. It is possible to divide the biometric
cryptosystems in two different classes: key-binding biometric cryptosystem, and
key-generating biometric cryptosystem.
Key-binding biometric cryptosystems store helper data by biding the tem-
plate with a chosen cryptographic key. The binding process obtains a helper
data considerable as a single entity that embeds both the key and the template
without revealing information about them. In fact, it is computationally hard to
estimate the key or the template without knowing the user’s biometric data. The
authentication is performed by using the query template in order to retrieve the
cryptographic key from the helper data. Usually, this task is based on error cor-
rection algorithms. If the obtained key corresponds to the correct cryptographic
key, the result of the authentication is a match value. Fig. 4 shows a general
schema of the key-binding biometric cryptosystem.This class of methods has two
main advantages. First, the helper data does not reveal much information about
the key or the biometric data. Moreover, this approach is tolerant to intra-user
variations. The main limitation consists in the degradation of the accuracy of the
biometric system caused by the substitution of the original matching algorithms
with error correction schemes. Moreover, these methods do not guarantee diver-
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Fig. 5. Key generating biometric cryptosystem: enrollment and verification.
sity and revocability. The firstly proposed key-binding biometric cryptosystems
based on fingerprints are Mytec1 and Mytec2 [40], which are based on the cor-
relation between filter functions and the biometric images. Another well-known
approach in the literature is the fuzzy commitment scheme [30]. This approach
combines error correcting codes algorithms and cryptography techniques in or-
der to achieve a cryptographic primitive called fuzzy commitment. During the
enrollment, a biometric template x composed by a fixed length feature vector
and a codeword w of an error correction schema C are bound. The helper data
(fuzzy commitment) consists in x − w and h (w), where h is a hash function.
The biometric matching tries to reconstruct w starting from a biometric query
x′. First, the stored value x − w is subtracted from x′, obtaining w′ = w + δ,
where w′ = x′ − x. If the value w is obtained by applying the error correction
schema C to w′, the result of the matching step is positive. The fuzzy vault [29]
approach uses a set A to lock a secret key k, yielding a vault VA. If the key
k is reconstructed by using a set B that is sufficiently similar to A, the vault
VA is unlocked. This approach is based on polynomial encoding and error cor-
rection algorithms. Examples of other approaches appertaining to this class are
the shielding functions [21] and distributed source coding [16]. In the literature,
there are methods based on different biometric traits. For example, face [22],
fingerprint [38], iris [31], and signature [33].
Key generating biometric cryptosystems compute a cryptographic key di-
rectly from the biometric data. The recognition process performed by biometric
systems based on key generating biometric cryptosystems is similar to the one
executed by using key-binding biometric cryptosystems but do not requires ex-
ternal keys. The schema of this process is shown in Fig. 5. The main advantage
of these methods is that the obtained cryptographic keys can be used in many
applications. However, an important problem is that it is difficult to generate
keys with high stability and entropy [23, 9]. Two well-known approaches are the
secure sketch and fuzzy extractor [15]. Secure sketches solve the problem of error
tolerance, enabling the computation of a public key P from a biometric reading
r, such as from another reading r′ sufficiently close to r it is possible to recon-
struct the original one. Fuzzy extractors address the problem of non-uniformity
by associating a random uniform string R to the public string P still keeping
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all the properties of secure sketches. Indeed, fuzzy extractors can be built out
of secure sketches and enable to recovering of the secret uniform random string
R, from the knowledge of the public string P and a reading r′ sufficiently close
to r. A syndrome-based key-generating scheme called PinSketch is presented
in [15]. Similarly to the fuzzy vault, this method is based on polynomial in-
terpolation. Compared with the fuzzy vault, the PinSketch scheme reduces the
computational time, and length of the public key. During the enrollment phase,
a syndrome based on polynomial interpolation is computed and stored as helper
data. During the recognition phase, an error vector is computed from the query
biometric sample and the helper data to recover the enrolled biometric. An ap-
proach based on multiple biometric traits is presented in [13]. This method is
based on the fuzzy commitment scheme. During the enrollment phase, one bio-
metric reading is xored with a random bit string obtained after a pseudo random
permutation from the other biometric reading. Differently, during the verification
phase, the process is inverted and the second biometric template is reconstructed
in order to be used as preliminary check (by comparing the computed hash with
the value stored into the identifier) and as input of the matching module. In the
literature, there are also other types of key-binding biometric cryptosystem [52,
34].
3.3 Cryptographically secure methods
The recognition accuracy of systems based on cancelable biometrics can be de-
creased by the applied transformation functions. Similarly, in biometric cryp-
tosystems it is not possible to always adopt the best matching functions used
in the plain domain and, as a consequence, the accuracy can be worsened. As
a solution to this problem, in the literature there are template protection tech-
niques specifically designed with the aim to perform the biometric recognition
without applying transformations of the biometric data and without modifying
the matching functions designed for the adopted templates. These methods can
directly perform the matching using the encrypted data and are usually based
on homomorphic cryptosystems.
In homomorphic cryptosystems, given a set M (resp., C) of the plaintexts
(resp., ciphertexts), for any given encryption key k the encryption function E
satisfies
∀m1,m2 ∈M, E (m1 ⊙M m2)← E (m1)⊙C E (m2)
for some operators ⊙M in M and ⊙C in C, where ← means “can be directly
computed from”, that is, without any intermediate decryption [20].
The main advantage of these systems is that the accuracy obtained by us-
ing the transformed templates is very similar to the accuracy obtained by using
the plain data. Usually, a decreasing of the performance can be caused by an
excessive quantization or data reduction [5]. The main disadvantage is that it is
difficult to adopt homomorphic cryptosystems in biometric systems that require
complex matching functions. Homomorphic cryptosystems are also computation-
ally expensive.
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Fig. 6. Example of a cryptographically secure method based on fingerprints. The bio-
metric matching algorithm is processed in the encripted domain exploiting a homo-
morphic cryptosystem.
A cryptographically secure method designed for distributed architectures is
proposed in [4, 3]. This method is based on the fingerprint biometric trait and
uses a feature representation called Fingercode [26], which consists in a set of
numeric values obtained by applying Gabor filters with different orientations
to the fingerprint image. The cryptographic protocol strongly relies on the no-
tion of additively homomorphic encryption and uses two encryption schemes:
the Paillier’s encryption scheme [41] and a variant of the El Gamal encryption
scheme [17] ported on Elliptic Curves. On the client side, the template is com-
puted, quantized and encrypted using the public-key of the client. The server
computes the match score in the encrypted domain by exploiting the homomor-
phic properties of the adopted cryptosystem. The match score consists in the
quadratic Euclidean distance between the evaluated templates. During the final
task of the recognition process, the server interacts with the client in order to
select, in the ciphertext domain, the enrolled identities with the related distances
that are below a fixed threshold. Fig. 6 shows the schema of this method.
A similar approach that use the homomorphic encryption is presented in [18,
48] and is designed for face recognition systems. In the literature, there are also
approaches based on homomorphic encryption methods and designed for bio-
metric systems that compute the match score as the Hamming distance between
feature vectors (e.g. Iriscode [14]): the system in [51] is based on the Blum-
Goldwasser cryptosystem, the system in [10] on the Goldwasser-Micali scheme,
the system in [8] on the method on homomorphic properties of Goldwasser-
Micali and Paillier cryptosystems, the system in [50] on the ElGamal scheme
and Garbled Circuits.
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4 Conclusions
Relevant privacy and security aspects have to be considered during the design
phase and the deployment of biometric systems in order to prevent possible
thefts and misuses of biometric data.
The use of biometric data, in fact, presents different privacy risks. Usually,
the risks perceived by the users are different from the real risks related to a
biometric application. The perceived risks are difficult to evaluate because they
are different for each individual. In general, the perceived risks are related to
identity thefts and to improperly uses of the personal data (for example, for
tracing all the activities of the individuals or for operating proscription lists).
Differently, the real risks are related to the applicative context and are deter-
mined by different factors, such as the used storage techniques, the owner of the
system, the used biometric traits, and other design choices.
In order to properly design a privacy-protective biometric system, it is nec-
essary to follow specific guidelines regarding the treatment of biometric data.
These guidelines consider the storage modalities, rights of the users, responsibil-
ities of the operators, and data protection techniques.
In the literature, there are different methods for the protection of biomet-
ric data. Most of these methods are designed for the protection of the bio-
metric templates, which are abstract representations of the distinctive features
extracted from the biometric samples (signals, images or frame sequences). Tem-
plate protection methods permit to perform the identity comparison by using
protected representations of the biometric templates, and can be divided in three
different classes: cancelable biometrics (based on transformations of the tem-
plates), biometric cryptosystems (based on cryptographic algorithms that per-
form the recognition by comparing cryptographic keys), and cryptographically
secure methods (based on cryptographic techniques that permits to perform a
set of operations without converting the data in the plain domain). The use of
these methods can effectively increase the security of the biometric systems, but
can reduce the obtained performances in terms of accuracy and computational
time. The transformation functions used by cancelable biometrics, in fact, can
decrease the accuracy of the recognition system. Similarly, in biometric cryp-
tosystems, it is not possible to always adopt the best matching functions used in
the plain domain and, as a consequence, the accuracy can be worsened. Crypto-
graphically secure methods are designed to solve these problems, but are usually
based on computationally expansive algorithms and can require a data reduction
step in order to increase the speed of the recognition process.
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